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APPLICATION OF THE LAW OF THE ABSENT*
SOVEREIGN IN TERRITORY UNDER BELLIGERENT
OCCUPATION: THE SCHIO MASSACRE

Eric Steint

I
THE ScHIO MASSACRE

0

N July 6, 1945, in the village of Schio, a small community in the
northern Italian Province 1 of Vicenza, fifty-four persons confined in the Schio jail were shot to death by masked men who had forced
their way into the prison. A large majority of the p·ersons held in the
Schio jail at the time of the shooting were suspected of collaboration
with the Germans, and other political crimes. No formal charges were
pending against one-third of the prisoners. At the time of the massacre
the area was under the rule of the Allied Military Government.
Seven former partisans were arrested and charged before an Allied
Military Court with the premeditated murder of the fifty-four prisoners and the attempted murder of thirty-one others.
The court acquitted two of the accused for lack of evidence and
sentenced two to life imprisonment and other penalties. The remaining
three, whose confessions to the shooting had been corroborated by other
evidence, were sentenced to death, in application of the Italian Penal
Code.
A formal petition for review was filed by the defendants, ~rguing
lack of corroboration of the confessions, claiming that there had been
no premeditation and stressing that the accused had been merely carrying out orders. Above all; the petition pleaded for clemency on the
basis of the defendants' record as partisans.
On review, the judgment of the court was confirmed as to the two
life sentences 'and the acquittals by the Chief Legal Adviser to the
Chief Civil Affairs Officer of the Allied Military Government for
* For the purpose of brevity the term "absent" sovereign shall be used to indicate
the governmental authority holding the legal sovereignty of the occupied territory
and functioning outside of such territory.
J.D., University of Michigan Law School, J.D., University of Prague Law
School; former Research Assistant, University of Michigan Law School; member of
the Illinois Bar.
1
A "Province" is the basic administrative geographic sub-division of the national
administrative system in Italy.

t
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-Italy.2 The three death sentences brought before the Chief Civil Affairs
Officer himself, as prescribed by the appropriate provisions of the
Allied Proclamation,8 were commuted to sentences of life imprisonment. This final decision was made public in the form of statement
to the press issued by the Allied Commission Public Relations Office
in Rome on December· 20, 1945. After briefly recapitulating the facts
of the case, the press release proceeded as follows:
"2. The three death sentences were brought before me as
Chief Civil Affairs Officer of Occupied Territory under Allied
Military Government, Italy, for confirmation in pursuance to the
established procedure. On review of the record of the trial, I am
fully satisfied that the accused have received a full and fair trial,
and that the sentences imposed were well founded.
"3. The massacre committed at Schio was of such a nature as
to put those responsible beyond consideration of clemency.
"4. However, I felt bound to take into consideration the
following facts:
(a) The fifty-four men and women murdered in the
Schio jail were Italian men and women.
(b) The convicted murderers were Italian men.
( c) The law which they outraged and under which they
were charged and sentenced by the Allied Military Court was
Italian law.
(d) The crime they committed was a crime against Italian sovereignty.
( e) The accused were not sentenced to death for violation of any order of the Military Governor.
"5. Italy in 18 89 was among the first nations of the world
to abolish the death penaJty. The abolition of the death penalty
is not exclusively an Italian legal concept. In Switzerland, and
even in-the United States in certain states where the law is purely
of Anglo-Saxon origin, the death penalty cannot be imposed. The
banishment of capital punishmen,t became a firmly established
principle in Italian pre-fascist legislation. It remained so until the
advent of fascism. The Penal Code of 1930 enacted during fascist
rule re-introduced the death penalty as a typical innovation serving the new regime, thus breaking the tradition of pre-fascist

a

2
Col. John K. Weber, U. S. Army, of San Antonio, Texas, held the position of
the Chief Legal Advisor at the time of the final disposal of the Schio case.
8 Proclamation No. I, Art. XII, sec. II: "Sentence of Death.-No sentence of
death shall be executed unless and until confirmed in writing by me, [i.e., Chief
Civil Affairs Officer] or by a specified officer not below the rank of Brigadier General
or Brigadier to whom I may have delegated such power in writing."
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Italy. The first Bonomi Government passed the Decree of IO
August 1944 once again abolishing capital punishment as a general
form of punishment under the Penal Code.
"6. At that time Allied military operations in Italy were in
full progress, most of Northern Italy was in enemy hands, and
this Decree was therefore not implemented by Allied Military
Government in Northern Italy. As a result, the three accused in
the present case were correctly charged and sentenced to death
under the original and unamended text of the Penal Code. However, had the accused been charged with the same offence in territory restored to the Italian Government, they could not have been
so sentenced, even in an AMG court. Similarly, the death sentence
in this case could not have been confirmed by me had the northern
regions been restored to Italian Government administration by
this date.
"7. In deference to the pre-fascist concepts of punishment
under Italian law, which the present Italian Government has reaffirmed, because I consider that military authorities governing
under the law of occupation in a civilized state are but custodians
of its fundamental legal institutions, and because I do not conceive
it to be Allied policy toward Italy to override Italian basic concepts
of justice with respect to a civil crime committed by Italians against
Italians, regardless of how such- a crime would be dealt with in
Allied countries, the death sentences against FRANCESCHINI
Renzo, FOCHESATO Antonio and BORTOLOSO Valentino
are modified to sentences of imprisonment for life. Because of the
nature of the crime, it is my intention to request of the Italian
Government that no future general or individual amnesty be
applied to these prisoners."
( s) Ellery W. · Stone
Rear Admiral, USNR
Chief Civil Affairs Officer 4

II
Dm A. M. G. llivE

A

LEGAL DuTY TO CoMMUTE THE DEATH
SENTENCES?

In commuting the death sentences, the Chief Civil Affairs Officer
purported to and in fact did give effect to the Italian Decree 224 of
August 10, 1944 abolishing capital punishment under the Italian Penal
Code.
4
Quoted from the text released by the Public Relations Branch, Allied Commission, Rome, on December 20, 1945.
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A perusal of his statement reveals, however, that he did not consider himself legally bound to do so but was merely exercising a discretionary power of pardon motivated by the Allied public policy in
Italy. Moreover, in paragraph 6 of the statement, he expressly affirmed
the legality of the death sentences imposed by the Vicenza court under
the unamended text of the Penal Code and in disregard of Decree 224
which had not been "implemented" by Allied Military G_overnment in
territory administered by that government.
A question arises whether, in the light of international law, the
Allied Military Government acted within its powers in refusing to
"implement" Decree 224 in occupied Italian territory. The legality
of the death sentences imposed by the Court of Vicenza depended on
the answer to this question.
A brief exposition of the general practice adopted by the Allied
Military Government concerning the legislation of the post-fascist
Italian governments appears necessary for an adequate understanding
of the issue under consideration.
Shortly after the signing of the surrender to the Allied Armies
in the fall of 1943 the King of Italy, exercising his powers under the
Italian constitution, appointed a cabinet of undersecretaries with its seat
at Brindisi.
While the rest of ·liberated southern Italy was made subject to
Allied Military Government, the four provinces of the Puglie Region
were left to the exclusive jurisdiction of the new Italian Government.5
In these provinces the King with the new government exercised legislative power in accordance with Italian law. The laws thus enacted
were published in the Italian Official Gazette. At that time, Allied
authorities took the position that this new legislation could_ not have
any effect and would not be given any force in that part of Italy which
was occupied by Allied troops and administered by Allied Military
Government. No announcement to this effect or any other formal act
of Allied Military Government was made or deemed necessary.
When in June, 1944 a politically more representative Italian government was established in Rome, 6 the Allied Military Government
laid down the following policy: (a) While the new legislation of the
Italian Government did not become automatically effective in the
G For a more detailed account of A.M.G. organization and functioning and its
relationship with the Italian Government see REVIEW OF THE -ALLIED MILITARY
GovERNMENT AND ALLIED CoMM. IN ITALY, Allied Comm., pp. 8-12 (1945).
6
REVIEW oF THE ALLIED MILITARY GovERNMENT AND ALLIED CoMM. IN
ITALY, ALLIED CoMM., pp. 41 et seq. (1945).

LAW OF BELLIGERENT OccuPATION

345

Allied Military Government territory it would be extended to occupied
areas to the rear of the zone of operation upon the order of a responsible Allied Military Government officer; only those laws or parts
thereof inconsistent with Allied Military Government legislation or
policy would be excluded from this "implementation" procedure.
{b) The "implementation" was to take place by means of Allied Military Government orders, to be published from time to time on the last
page of the Italian Gazette.7
There were relatively few instances where the Allied Military
Government found it necessary either to exclude any such new law
from "implementation" or to implement it in a modified form. Among
the laws which the Allied Military Government excluded from "implementation" was Decree 224. The question is whether the Allied
Military Government acting for the Allied occupying powers had the
right to do so without violating the obligations of these powers under
international law.

III
POWERS OF A.

M. G.

TO DENY IMPLEMENTATION TO LEGISLATION OF

THE ABSENT I TAI.IAN SOVEREIGN

A. Under Documents of Surrender
The rights of a power occupying enemy territory subsequent to the
conclusion of an armistice with the enemy are primarily determined by
the clauses of the armistice agreement. Thus the powers of the Allied
Military Government in Italy after the signing of the documents of
surrender 8 were primarily defined by the provisions of these instruments embodying the armistice agreements concluded between the
governments of the United States, the United Kingdom and the Soviet
Union, "acting on behalf of the United Nations" on one side and the
Italian government on the other side. It is therefore to these documents that we look for the answer to the question under consideration.
7 Each order of implementation provided that all decress contained in a specified
issue of the Official Gazette, with the exception, if any, of the objectionable legislation, should come into effect in each Province in the Allied occupied territory on
the date on which the Prefect (the highest administrative official in the Province)
of such Province shall officially receive from the A.M.G. a copy of the Gazette containing the order. The order of "implementation" could provide that the laws shall be
"implemented" in occupied territory with certain specified modifications.
8
For the text of the documents of surrender see UNITED STATES AND ITALY,
1936-1946, DocUMENTARY RECORD, Department of State, Publication 2669, European Ser. 17, pp. 51-66 (1946).
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Article IO of the so-called "short armistice" document signed in
Sicily on September 3, 1943, provides:
"The Commander in Chief of the Allied Forces reserves to
himself the right to take any measure which in his opinion may
be necessary for the protection of the interests of the Allied Forces
for the prosecution of the war, and the Italian Government binds
itself to take such administrative or other action as the Commander
in Chief may require, and in particular the Commander in Chief
will establish Allied Military Government over such parts of the
Italian territory as he may deem necessary in the military interests
of the Allied Nations."
The remaining clau~es of the document fall into two groups. Dne
group contains provisions ensuring the capitulation of the Italian Armed
Forces as usually provided in an armistice agreement.9 The second
group of clauses grew out of the necessity for Italian territory to serve
as an operational base in the war against Germany.10
Again, it was stipulated in the "Additional Conditions of Armistice
with Italy" or "Long Terms" signed at Malta on September 29, 1943
that "The Forces of the United Nations will require to occupy certain
parts of Italian territory" (Article 18). Article 20 provides that:
"Without prejudice to the provisions of the present instrument
the United Nations will exercise all the rights of an occupying
power 11 throughout the territories or areas referred to in article
I 8, the administration of which will be provided for by the issue
of proclamations, orders or regulations. Personnel of the Italian
administrative, judicial, and public services will carry out their
functions under the control of the Allied Commander-in-Chief
unless otherwise directed."
Other clauses of the document specify in detail the measures to be
taken by the Italian authorities for the purpose of carrying out the
military capitulation 12 and making available installations and facilities
to the Allied Forces in their war against the German enemy.18 Other
provisions reserve certain rights to Allied Armies in non-occupied Italian territory 14 and impose upon the Italian Government economic,
9

Arts. 1, 3., 4, 8, 9, l I.
io Arts. 2, 5-7.
11 Italics supplied.
12
Arts. 1-13, 32A, 27, 28, 34, 37•
18
Arts. 14, 15, 16, 17, 19.
14
See Art. 21.
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financial and political obligations as well as duties to take certain administrative and legislative steps.15
Article IO of the "short armistice" and Articles I 8 and 20 of the
"Long Terms" are the only ones to refer specifically to the status of
Allied Military Government in Italy. Consequently, any power claimed
by Allied Military Government and not provided for in these articles,
must fall within the categories of "rights of an occupying power'' in
accordance with Article 20 of the "Long Terms." Therefore the question at issue assumes the following form: can it be said that the right
of the Allied Military Government to exclude Italian legislation en, acted by the Italian Government subsequent to the signing of the documents of surrender ( and specifically Decree 224) is included among
the "rights of an occupying power." The answer to this question must
be sought in the international law of occupation.

B. Under International Law
• Although there exist various forms of occupation, the international
law of today provides rules, in the technical sense, for the belligerent
occupation only. The main body of rules was codified in the Regulations Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, annexed to
the Fourth Hague Convention of 1907, and specifically in Section III
thereof, entitled "Military Authority over the Territory of the Hostile
State." The rules were supplemented by decisions of tribunals, international practice and writings of leading authorities.
Admittedly, Section III appears to apply expressly only to the
typical case of a belligerent occupation where one belligerent has overrun a part of the territory of the opposing enemy belligerent, where
the fighting is still in progress and no armistice agreement has been
concluded. Section III did not give rise to any generally accepted rules
which would govern other types of occupation, such as the occupation
continuing after or effected by virtue of an armistice agreement. Special
rules purporting to regulate these types of occupation and propounded
by certain authors and tribunals are controversial, as will be shown
below, and all are in fact based on deductions and modifications of
Section III.16
In these circumstances, the following would appear an appropriate
15

Arts. 22-26, 29-33, 35-36.

16 FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT
CUPATION
HEYLAND,

Oc6-7 (1942); Czybichowski, 18 ZEIT. F. VoLKERRECHT 295 (1934);
DIE R.EcHTSTELLUNG DER BESETZTEN RHEINLANDE 68 (1923).
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method for an inquiry whether the provisions of Section III are applicable in determining the rights and duties of an occupant in the case
of an armistice occupation:
(a) to examine the intent of the parties to the armistice agreement
in the light of its text and surrounding circumstances;
(b) to consider the practice of governments, decisions of tribunals
and views of authors, with due weight given to the rationale of the
provisions of Section III and to such practical factors as might lead in
the future to the establishment of a generally accepted regime governing an armistice occupati<;m.
I.

Hague Regulations and the_ Allied arrn,istice occupation in Italy

a. Application of Section III. Hostilities in the territory of the
defeated belligerent are usually terminated as a result of a general
armistice.17 In Italy, however, it was apparent at the time of the signing of the documents of surrender that operations against German
forces would ·continue without interruption even though the extent of
the operations could perhaps not be esti1mated. Although hostilities
with Italy had ended, hostilities in Italy were far from an end.
At the time of the signing of the documents of surrender, Sicily
with adjacent islands and portions of southern Italy were being administered by the Allied Military Government under the regime of
belligerent occupation governed by Section III of the Regulations. In
view of the contip.uing hostilities, it was obviously the intention of the
parties to the documents that the powers held by the Allied occupant
under this regime should continue after the signing of the documents.
In fact, the documents of surrender conferred upon the Allied occupant
additional new power in areas occupied before the signing and to be
occupied thereafter. Moreover, for reasons of military necessity, the
documents granted the Allied Commander in Chief important powers,
even in unoccupied Italian territory, such as the right of transit, and
use of Italian facilities.
The applicability of Section III is further supported by the already
mentioned clause in the "Long Terms" granting to the Allied occupant
the "rights of an occupying power','' for Section III is the only gener17 For definitions of a "general" and "local" armistice see Article 37 of the
Regulations annexed to the Fourth Hague Convention of October 18, 1907, Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land. For further classification of armistice
agreements, see 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed., by Lauterpaeht, 433+41 (1944).
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ally accepted source of international law defining such rights with a
degree of certainty.
b. The new Italian laws and the "laws in force" under Article 43
of the Hague Regulations. The only relevant rule of Section III is
contained in Article 43 which provides as follows:
"The authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into
the hands of the occupant the latter shall take all the measures in his
power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety,
while respecting, unless absolutely prevented, the laws in force in the
country." 18
The express obligation to respect the laws of the occupied country
imposed upon the occupant by the last clause of this article refers only
to those laws which were "in force" in the occupied territory at the time
of the commencement of the occupation. This interpretation follows
naturally from the language used and has been generally accepted by
legal scholars.19
·
The new Italian laws enacted after the signing of the documents
of surrender could not be considered as "laws in force" in any of the
occupied portions of Italy. In northern Italy, where the Schio case
occurred, the "law in force" at the time of the establishment of Allied
Military Government, was the Penal Code of 1930 under which the
defendants were sentenced to death by the Court of Vicenza. Decree
224 amending the code could not become applicable in that area at the
time of its enactment in the summer of I 944 nor at any time thereafter
prior to the liberation of northern Italy because until then the territory
had been under the de facto rule of the so-called Government of the
Social Italian Republic, the fascist rebel group operating with the blessing of the Commander in Chief of the German Armies in Italy.20
18
Italics supplied. Quoted from TM 27-251, U. S. War Dept. Technical Manual,
Treaties Governing Land Warfare, p. 31 (1944). The phrase "public order and
safety'' used in the English translation does not adequately represent the meaning
of "vie publique" which describes the entire social and commercial life of the country.
2 WESTLAKE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, 2d ed., 95 (1913).
19
See, e.g., Cillekens v. De Haas, District Court of Rotterdam, May 14th, 1919,
ANN. Die. OF PuB. INT. L., 1919-1922, p. 471, Case No. 336 (1932); FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMic LAW OF BELLIGERENT OccuPATION 135
(1942); Loening, "L'administration du Gouvernement-General de l'Alsace durant la
Guerre de 1870-1871," 4 REv. DE DR. INT. 622 at 652 (1872); 2 GARNER, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE WORLD WAR, § 365, p. 63 (1920).
20
This so-called Social Republican government claimed to be the only legitimate
Italian government and of course did not permit the new legislation of the King's
Government to be promulgated in territory under its control. In fact, the Republican
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At the time of the liberation it· was the Allied Military Government, not the Italian government, which assumed the de facto control
in northern Italy. 21 As indicated in Part II, no "new" law enacted by
the Italian Government after the signing-of the documents of surrender
nee-fascists had regularly promulgated their own new legislation in this territory. It
could be argued that the entire legislation of the legitimate government including
Decree 224 did come into effect in northern Italy despite this de facto obstacle and
notwithstanding the fact that it had not been promulgated and had even been entirely
unknown in that area. This argument would be based on the proposition that it was
the legitimate government of the King which at all times had retained legal sovereignty
with full legislative powers over the entire territory; that such powers could not be
curtailed· by a de facto rebel group. Obviously, the question involving legal effects
in Italian law of de facto existence and acts of the so-called Social Republic will
ultimately be resqlved in accordance with Italian municipal law. However, irrespective
of this question, it appeared entirely permissible for the Allied Military Government
to take the realistic view that for its purposes the King's Government, although the
only recognized sovereign of Italy, could legislate with immediate effect only in that
part of Italy which was effectively under i~ control. Thus, as far as the Allied Military Government was concerned, the King's Government could not legislate directly
either in the Allied Military Government territory or in northern Italy while the
latter was being administered by the fascist Republican rebel group. This group,
although not recognized by the United Nations governments, did in fact exercise considerable governmental authority and its armed units were even accorded some privileges
of a belligerent under international law. Certain analogy between the de facto status
of a belligerent enemy occupant and that of a belligerent rebel group fighting the
legitimate government had in fact been recognized. See McNair, "Municipal Effects
of Belligerent Occupation," 57 L. Q. REv. 33 at 55 (1941). If, however, we accept
the assumption that northern Italy had in fact been occupied and administered by the
German Commander in Italy as an occupant with the rebel authorities simply acting
as his tool, the question woud then present itself whether the. German occupant was
warranted to exclude from German occupied Italy the new laws of the legitimate
government of Rome. The German government had not recognized in any way the
Italian government of Rome as the "absent" sovereign. On the other hand the German
government granted full recognition as Italian sovereign to and considered itself allied
with the fascist republican rebel government.
21
It could perhaps be argued that in certain areas of northern Italy Italian
partisans, directed by the National Committee of Liberation for Upper Italy (CLNAI),
had assumed the reins of government from the fleeing fascists several days before the
arrival of the Allied Forces and before the establishment of Allied Military Government. Consequently, the argument would proceed, CLNAI acting as it did in the
capacity of an agent of the legitimate government of Rome had brought the area
under effective control of this government with the result that the entire legislation
of this government, including Decree 224, became effective therein before the establishment of Allied Military Government. To this view one might retort that CLNAI
as agent of the legitimate government was bound by the undertaking of this government to consent to the setting up of Allied Military Government as an exclusive de
facto authority immediately succeeding the rule of the fascists. Such undertaking may
readily be construed both from the armistice agreement and from the prolonged coordinated planning of the Allied and Italian authorities for the steps to be taken upon
the liberation of northern Italy, based throughout on the assumption that northern
Italy was to be occupied and administered by the Allies.
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was permitted to come into effect in any part of the Allied Military

Government territory without an appropriate order from this government. As a result, Decree 224 could not be considered as a "law in
force" in the occupied territory within the meaning of Article 43 and
the Allied occupant was not bound under this clause to "respect" the
provisions of the decree.

A. M. G. as de. facto holder of "the authority of the legitimate
power'' under Article 43 of the Hague Regulations
Let us now turn to the first clause of Article 43 providing that "the
authority of the legitimate power having in fact passed into the hands
of the occupant" the latter should take all measures to ensure public
order and saftey. A question arises as to the scope of "the authority of
the legitimate power" which has "in fact" passed into the hands of the
occupant. Is the occupant, by virtue of such authority, entitled to exclude from occupied territory the new laws of the "absent" legitimate
sovereign? Specifically, could the Allied Military Government by
virtue of such authority, as a necessary measure for the restoration and
maintenance of public order and safety exclude Decree 224 from occupied territory?
Widely varying definitions of the occupant's status under Article
43 were offered by courts and writers of various nationalities.
2.

a. Anglo-American doctrine and practice

( r) The doctrine. Oppenheim, the leading British author in the
field, suggested the following "platform" which expresses adequately
the prevailing modern Anglo-American view:
r. " ... Through military occupation the authority over the
territory and the inhabitants only de facto, and not by right, and
only temporarily and not permanently passes into the hands of the
occupant.
2. " ••• Since the occupant is de facto in authority, he has a
right of administration over the territory, with the consequence
that all administrative acts which he carries out in accordance with
the laws of war and the existing local law must be recognized by
the legitimate government after the occupation. . . . " 22
22
Oppenheim, "The Legal Relations between an Occupying Power and the
Inhabitants," 33 L. Q. REV. 363 at 363, 364 (1917). For other authority on belligerent occupant's status under Article 43 see HALL, TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
LAw, 7th ed., 496, 497 (1917); Baty, "The Relations of Combatants to Insurgents,"
36 YALE L. J. 966 (1927) ("it makes little difference whether the occupant's power
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. The authoritative United States Army Field lvlanual on Rules of
Land Warfare 28 issued in pursuance of Article I of the Fourth Hague
Convention 24 contains the following. provision relating to the specific
question of the occupant's power to deny e:ffect to the "absent" sovereign's legislation:
"All the functions of the hostile government-legislative, executive, or administrative- . . . cease under military occupation,
or continue only with the sanction ... of the occupier.... " 25
In Hyde's opinion "the possession by the belligerent occupant of
the right to control, maintain or modify laws that are to obtain within
the occupied area is an exclusive one" 26 and "the occupant must regard
the exercise by the hostile government of legislative . . . functions ...
as in defiance of his authority, except in so far as it is undertaken with
his sanction or cooperation." 21
According to the British and United States doctrine the provisions
of Section III apply not only to a belligerent occupation stricto sensu
but also to any type of armistice occupation, except of course as modified
by the clauses of the armistice agreement.
Thus, for instance, the official British Army Manual of Military
Law provides:
is called 'quasi-sovereignty' or if the limits of his power be characterized as "the
military exigencies of an occupying force"); LAW OF BELLIGERENT OccuPATION,
J.A.G.S. Text 11, p. 35 (1944) ("It is believed that the better view is that the
legitimate sovereign, is deprived of the power to legislate for the occupied territory
by· the promulgation of new laws or decrees. According to the American view, the
sovereignty of the legitimate government is suspended during occupation • • • ") ;
TM 27-250, U.S. WAR DEPT. TECHNICAL MANUAL, TREATIES GovERNING LAND
WARFARE, pp. 7, 13 (1944); SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 322, 366-7 (1911);
Ochoa v. Hernandez, 230 U.S. 139, 33 S.Ct. 1033 (1913). For a less recent and preHague authority see United States v. Rice, 4 Wheat. (17 :U.S.) 246 ai: 253 (1819)
(with the statement of Justice Story that the occupant had the right to exercise "all
civil and military authority over the place"); TAYLOR,. A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL
PUBLIC LAW 584, 588, 591, 596, 615 (1901); Thirty Hogsheads of Sugar v. Boyle,
9 Cranch (13 U.S.) 19i (1815); Fleming v. Page, 9 How. (50 U.S.) 603 (1850);
also Privy Council in Gerasimo, I I Moo. P. C. 8 8 ( I 8 57) ; British Prize Courts,
The Fama, 5 C. Rob. 106 (1804); Courts of Common Law, Donaldson v. Thompson,
I Camp. 429 (1808) and Hagedorn v. Bell, I M. & S. 450 (1813).
28
1940 ed.
.
24 "The Contracting Powers shall issue instructions to their armed land forces
which shall be in conformity with the Regulations respecting the Laws and Customs
of War on Land, annexed to the present Convention."
25
Par. 283.
26 3 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY THE
UNITED STATES, 2d ed., 1886 (1945).
2
1Id. 1883.
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"The situation in occupied territory remains the same [that
is, during an armistice] as during hostilities." 28
The United States Army Field Manual on Rules of Land ·warfarc
follows the same view. 29
British and American authors place emphasis upon the fact that
although hostilities between the belligerents have been brought to an
end by a general armistice, a state of war continues and with it 'the
application of the laws of war. Both the occupation f'flagrante hello"
and the armistice occupation "nondum cessante hello" are types of a
belligerent occupation; both arise from the state of war and are
"founded upon force." The armistice agreement itself-as distinguished from the peace treaty-is called "a belligerent act" concluded
between military commanders. Thus conceived, the armistice occupation would have the same effect as the belligerent occupation stricto
sensu in suspending the legislative powers of the "absent" sovereign
in the occupied territory.80
( 2) The practice. Section III of the Hague Regulations was applied during the armistice occupation of Germany by the Allied and
United States Forces under the armistice agreement of November 11,
1918.81 Unlike the Italian situation, the hostilities in Europe had in
fact ceased by virtue of this armistice. Yet early in 1919 Marshal Foch,
the Allied Commander in Chief, made it known that until further
notice, no law issued by the Prussian or German Central Government
after the date of th~ armistice should be deemed to apply in occupied
BRITISH ARMY MANUAL oF MILITARY LAw, AMENDMENTS (No. 12) 1f 286
(1929).
29
FM 27-10, U.S. WAR DEPT. BASIC FIELD MANUAL, RULES OF LAND WARFARE, 1f 265d (1940).
so 2 WHEATON'S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th Eng. ed. by Keith,
771 (1929); SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 245-247 (1911); Colby, "Occupation
under the Laws of War," 25 Coi. L. REv. 904 at 905, 911 (1925); FEILCHENFELD,
THE INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC LAW OF BELLIGERENT OccUPATION 110-114 (1942);
Report of the Second Sub-Commission of the Hague Conference of 1899, Hague
I.B.B. 148 in SPAIGHT, id. 245-247 (1911); LAW OF BELLIGERENT OccUPATioN,
J.A.G.S. Text 11, pp. 8-9 (1944); similarly, Cavaglieri, "La condizione giuridica
delle nuove provincie italiane prima dell'annessione," 88 ARCHIVIO GmRIDico 66-67,
73 ( I 922) ; 2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed. by Lauterpacht, p. 434
(1944); American Military Government of Occupied Germany, 1918-1920. Report
of the Officer in Charge of Civil Affairs 358 (1943); see also French Army Manual
in SPAIGHT, id. p. 247 stating that in the absence of a provision in the armistice agreement each belligerent has "absolute right to settle the question as he· chooses on the
territory held by him."
81
Basic Instruction No. 561/CR of Nov. 15, 1918 issued by Marshal Foch.
Also Ni!st, "L'occupation des territoires rhenans par Jes troupes Allies et des Etats-Unis
pendant !'armistice," 28 REV. GEN. DE DR. INT. PuB. 39 at 144 (1921).
28
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territory.82 No provision to this effect was contained in the armistice
protocol itself.ss
Again, the British Military Administration of Tripolitania, administering this Italian colony as occupied territory from the time of
the defeat of the Axis forces in North Africa, issued a Proclamation
in May, 1945 34 which reads as follows:
"WHEREAS it is desirable that the inhabitants should be left
in no doubt 35 as to the applicability in the occupied territory of
legislation enacted by or under the authority of the Italian State
since the British Military Occupation;
NOW THEREFORE, I, Charles Henry Gormley, Colonel,
Officer of the Most Excellent Order of the British Empire,
HEREBY PROCLAIM:ARTICLE I
As from the 23rd day of January 1943 no Law, Decree Law
or other legislative enactment of any kind made or passed by or
under the authority of the Italian State on or after the said date
shall be deemed to have applied or to apply to the occupied territory or any part thereof unless expressly proclaimed by the Chief
Administrator to be applicable thereto." 86
The proclamation was published almost two and a half years after
the commencement of the occupation and almost two years after the
date of the signing of the Italian documents of surrender. It was obviously designed to reaffirm the existence of a situation which came into
effect at the outset of the occupation by operation of international law.
A number of "new" Italian laws enacted by the Itali~n Govern82 ZITELMAN, ZWISCHENPRIVATRECHT IM BESETZEN GEBIETE IN FESTGABE FUER
OTTo LIEBMAN, Abt. I, p. 130, quoted in HEYLAND DIE RECHTSTLLUNG DER
BESETZTEN RHEINLANDE 73 (1923) and criticized on the ground that there hail not
been an effective occupation before December, 1918. ·
88 After the conclusion of the Rheinland Agreement in June, 1919 the Interallied Rheinland Commission was given power to examine, and if necessary to veto
the new German legislation, before it could become effective in occupied Germany.
Arts. 7 and 8 of the Ordinance No. I relating to the legislative power of the InterAllied High Commission were held illegal by the German Reichsfinanzhof q.ecision
of Dec. 7, 1926 in so far as restricting the right of the German Reich to legislate
with immedate effect in the Allied occupied territory of Germany. ANN. DIG. OF
PuB. INT. L., 1925-1926, Case No. 7, p. 9.
84 Proclamation No. 93, issued at Tripoli on May 2d, 1945.
85 Italics supplied.
86 The Tripolitania Gazette, Published by British Military Administration of
Tripolitania, Under the Authority of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer, No. IO of 1945,
15th May 1945, Part II.
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ment after the commencement of the British occupation, such as those
abolishing the fascist anti-Jewish legislation, were made applicable in
Tripolitania in the form of proclamations of the British occupant. However, the procedure of "implementation" of new Italian laws used by
Allied authorities in occupied Italy was not employed in Tripolitania
and would have been impracticable under the given circumstances.
Furthermore, the "implementation" procedure if used in Tripolitania
might possibly have been construed as prejudicing the ultimate disposal of this colony in accordance with the final peace settlement.

b. The German doctrine and practice

(I) The doctrine. In the view of an important school of German
jurisprudence, the power of the belligerent occupant stricto sensu is a
legal and not merely a factual power, since Section III of the Hague
Regulations could not possibly lay down limitations on such power
without recognizing its legal character.81 "The authority of the legitimate power" within the meaning of Article 43 is put entirely out of
operation by the occupation. While the legitimate power still retains
the sovereignty, it is the occupant who exercises in the occupied area
all the rights emanating from the sovereignty. 38 The laws of the
"absent" sovereign have no effect in occupied territory and their obu MEuER, DIE VoLKERREcHTLicHE STELLUNG DER voM FEIND BESETZTEN
GEBIETE 4 (1915); Max Huber, "Volkerrecht," 2 JAHRBUCH DES OFFENTLICHEN
RECHTS 470 at 570 (1908); HEYLAND, DIE REcHSTELLUNG DER BESETZTEN RHEINLANDE 7 (1923); Stauffenberg, "Vertraegliche Beziehungen des Occupanten zu den
Landeseinwohnern," 2 ZErT. F. OFFENTLICHES RECHT u. VoLKERRECHT, Nr. 1/2,
pp. 86 ff., l02 (1931); ANHOLT, DIE DEUTSCHE VERWALTUNG IN BELGIEN 6-7
(1917).
38
HEYLAND, id. 5-6. Some argue that the occupant's power is not derived from
national law (Staatsrechtliche Gewalt) but is a power derived from international law
(die hochste volkerrechtliche Gewalt, Loening, in HEYLAND, id. 8). Others agree
that the occupant exercises in occupied territory an authority derived from national
law but disagree in the purported consequences of this view: while some say that the
occupant acquires the sovereignty on condition subsequent (Gebietshoheit mit auflosender
Bedingung) over the occupied territory (Kohler, Frisch) others believe that no change
in the sovereignty takes place by the occupation. According to one school of thought
the occupant's authority is derived from the national law of the "absent" sovereign
of the occupied territory. (HEYLAND, id. 8 ff.) See also LrszT, DAs VoLKERRECHT,
12th ed. by Fleischmann (1925) giving on page 488 abundant references. Liszt himself
appears to follow the last mentioned school of thought in that he believes that "the
occupying State takes over the exercise of the 'Staatsgewalt' " ( the sovereign power
derived f!om national law) of the occupied State not, however, as the latter's agent
but by virtue of a right granted to him by international law (p. 490). Cf. STRUPP,
GRUNDZUEGE DES POSITIVEN VoLKERRECHTS 206 ( I 922).
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servance may expose the population to a punishment by the occupant
for breach of the "duty of obedience." 89
However, the situation according to this German view, is entirely
different in the case of an armistice occupation which is considered as
an occupation sui generis and called "occupatio mixta." Further distinction is made between a "genuine" armistice occupation of territory
occupied by virtue of the armistice, and a "non-genuine" armistice occupation where a belligerent occupation established before the armistice is continued after the armistice. Unless otherwise provided in the
armistice agreement the territory subject to a "non-genuine" armistice
occupation continues to be governed by Section III and the "legitimate
authority" which had passed to the occupant by an "act of force"
( Gewaltsakt) remains in his hands after the armistice. Contrariwise,
Section III does not apply in the territory occupied by virtue of an
armistice ( that is, by virtue of a "Konzession") and administered under
a "genuine" armistice occupation; the sovereign retains the legitimate
authority in occupied territory including the legislative power 40 unless the armistice agreement provides to the contrary.41
With a touch of Latin irony an Italian jurist pointed out that the
German armistice theory was spun principally in connection with the
Allied occupation of German territory after the cessation of hostilities
in World War l. 42 In fact, the German Supreme Court held that'the
Allied occupation of the Rheinland by virtue of the armistice agreement of November II, 1918, was not·a belligerent occupation in the
sense of the Hague Regulations. 43
( 2) The practice. The Franco-German armistice agreement of
June 22, 1940 provided that certain territory of France was to be occupied by German troops. Like the Allied occupant in Italy, the Ger39

HEYLAND, id. 12. Cf. The decision in the Cavalla case, Court of Thrace,
Themis 41, p: 417 and ANN. DIG. OF PuB. INT. L., 1929-1930, Case no. 292 p. 496
(1935).
40
See note 3 2, supra.
41 HEYLAND, DE RECHTSTELLUNG DER BESETZTEN RHEINLANDE 67 (1923);
KAMPS, "lnernationales Staats-und Verwaltungsrecht im besetzten Gebiet," 24
JuRISTEN-ZEITUNG 306 at 310 (1919). Kamps considers an armistice occupation a
"servitude of international law," a mere new name considering ,the absence of accepted
rules of law for "international servitudes." Strupp, "Das Waffenstillstandabkommen
zwischen Deutschland und der Entente vom November 1918 im Lichte des Volker•
rechtes," 11 ZErT. F. VoLKERRECHT 252 at 265 ff. (1920).
42
Ferrari, "Dell occupazione di territorio austro-ungarico," 19 R1v1sTA DI DIRITI'O
INTERNAZIONALE 460 (1927).
48
FoNTES JuRrs GENTIUM, Ser. A, Secio II. Tom. I, No. 253, p. 214.
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man Reich reserved to itself the privilege "to exercise all the rights
of the occupying power" in occupied France.44, Although the armistice
agreement contained no provision on this subject, actually the Vichy
government was permitted by the Germans to enact legislation which
would be effective automatically in all of France including the German
occupied territory.45 However, in occupied France the laws of the occupant were to prevail over any French legislation.46 From the material
on hand it is not clear whether the Vichy laws were subject to German
censorship before publication or whether each and every such law was
permitted to become effective in occupied France.47
In reviewing the German practice in France 48 it should be noted
that, unlike :the Italian situation of 1943, the ground operations in
France were almost at an end at the time of the Compiegne armistice
in 1940. Therefore, whatever difference might have existed between
the Allied and German concepts of armistice occupation, the important
factual dissimilarities in the circumstances surrounding the conclusion
of the armistice and reflecting upon the intention of the parties must
be given due weight.
It will be for the historian to determine to what extent the attitude
of the German occupant towards the new Vichy laws was due to the
German domination of the :Vichy government. Furthermore, such laws,
produced on a fantastic scale,49 accomplished for the occupant all the
44

For a synopsis of the Franco-German armistice agreement of 1940 see 6 HACKWORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 426-428 (1943).
45
LEMKIN, Axis RULE IN OccuPIED EuROPE 174 (1944). The "Gazette du
Palais" had pubished periodically a collection called "Legislation de }'occupation" with
the subtitle "Recueil des lois, decrets, ordonnances, arretes et circulaires des Authorites
Allemandes et Fran£aises, promulges depuis }'occupation." The collection reprinted
most (not all) of the legislation published in the official Vichy French "Journal Officiel
de l'Etat fran£ais," in the "Verordnungsblatt'' of the German Governor of occupied
territory and in the "Bulletin municipal officiel de la Ville de Paris." Similarly, the
"Bulletin Legislatif" published by Dalloz contains also "Lois, decrets, arretes, circulaires,
etc. et ordonnance des autorites d'occupation."
46
Verordnungsblatt fuer das besetzte Gebiet der franzoesischen Departments
Seine, Seine-et-Oise, und Seine-et-Marne No. 3, June 21, 1940, p. 13. See also
LEMKIN, id. 389.
47
,
It was pointed out above in note 46 that the volume of "Legislation d'occupation" did not contain all Vichy laws.
•
48
There is no evidence that the German Military Governor, following the German theoretical distinction between the "genuine" and "non-genuine" armistice occupation, established two different regimes in occupied France. See FEILCHENFELD, THE
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAw OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION 112 (1942).
49
PAUL JACOB, LES LOIS DE L'OCCUPATION EN FRANCE 22- (1942).
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purposes· which he could not have obtained by his own proclamations
without violating the international law of occupation, such as the forced
deportation of Frenchmen to war factories in the Reich and the transformation of the French Republic into a totalitarian state to Germany's
liking.60
c. The Belgian jurisprudence. A view differing from both the
Anglo-American and German concepts on the status of the belligerent
occupant is reflected in a considerable body of judicial precedents which
developed in Belgium as a result of the German belligerent occupation
during World War I. However, in these cases the question before the
court presented the so-called "postliminy" aspect of the problem: 61
a Belgium court sitting after the war had ended and after the German
occupant had evacuated Belgium, passed upon the question of whether
a specific law enacted by the Belgian legitimate sovereign during the
war and outside of occupied Belgium became effective in occupied Belgium at the time of its enactment. This question is only related and is
by no means identical to the issue under consideration.62
The weight of the Belgian judicial authority, seconded by writers,
denied that by virtue of Article 43 of the Hague Regulations the
exercise of the le~l authority of the "absent" sovereign would be
suspended and that in general the Hague Regulations wpuld bestow
any legal status whatever upon the occupant and its acts. According to
this view the Regulations simply established _circumscribing rules on
the de facto powers of the occupant obtained by a "triumph of force"
without impairing the legal power of the "absent" sovereign to determine the effects of his own new legislation in the occupied territory. 5 s
60 JACOB,

id. 21 .ff.
On the concept of "postliminium" see ,2 OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAW,
6th ed., by Lauterpacht, 480 ff. ( I 944).
52
While the latter presents a problem in international law requiring an interpretation of the Hague Regulations the former is determined primarily by municipal (in
this case Belgian) law and public policy, the question of the legality of an occupant's
act under international law being only one element, sometimes even entirely neglei::ted,
in the deliberations of the court. Cf. Decisions of the Court of Cassation of Belgium,
Dec. 4, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1920. I. 1, also in ANN. DIG. OF PuB. INT. L. 19191922, p. 459 (1932); April 29, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1919. I. 132 and of Jan.
21, 1918 Pasicrisie Belge, 1918. I. 177 and Oct. 16, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1919.
I. 225.
53
Court of Cassation, June 4, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1919. I. 153-4; Ch. De
Visscher, "L'occupation de guerre d'apres la jurisprudence de la Cour de Cassation de
Belgique," 34 L. Q. REv. 72 (1918). The view expressed by the highest Belgian
court in this and in the other cases cited in note 53, supra, constitutes a complete
reversal of the position taken by the court during the early stages of the occupation
51
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The Belgian courts found that there existed no constitutional obstacle
for the "absent" Belgian King to enact legislation with e:ffect in German occupied Belgium and that the insertion of such legislation in the
official Belgian journal "Moniteur Belge" published outside of occupied Belgium and not regularly distributed therein, must be taken
to constitute the type of publication required by Belgian law.54 This
view, the court maintained, must prevail "notwithstanding the obstructions which the occupying authority might have placed in the way
of the relations between the various parts of the country...." 55
In speakirig of obstructions, the court might have had in mind a
notice issued by the German occupant on January 4, I 9 I 5 providing
that "in -those parts of Belgium which are subject to the German
Government and from the day of the institution of this government,
only the ordinances of the Governor General and of his subordinate
authorities shall have the force of law. Orders issued from this day
onward by the King of Belgium and the Belgian Ministers do not
have the force of law within the domain of the German Government
of Belgium." 56 A Belgium Court Martial, again in a "postliminy"
case held this notice void as contravening the "rights of the Belgian
sovereignty." 57 Undoubtedly the notice, not unlike the announcement
of Marshal Foch and the British Proclamation in Tripolitania ( the
latter two, however, issued during an armistice regime) was considered
by the German occupant as merely declaratory of a condition prevailing from the commencement of the occupation by operation of international law.58
to the effect that by reason of the ratification of the Fourth Hague Convention by the
Belgian Law of May 25, 1910, orders of the occupying power made in virtue of Art.
+3 of the annexed Regulations derived from the law the same obligatory force as
Belgian laws. (Pasicrisie Belge, 1915-1916. I. 375). Cf. also Court of Appeal,
Liege, June 25, 1919 and Feb. 28, 1920 in Pasicrisie Belge, 1920. II. 298. For
further authority see OPPENHEIM, INTERNATIONAL LAw, 6th ed. by Lauterpacht, 342,
note 5 (1944). Cf. SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 355 (19n).
54
Court of Cassation, June 4, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1919. I. 97 However,
compare decision of the same court, Nov. 13, 1916, Pasicrisie Belge, 1917. I. 54See also decision of Feb. II, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1919. I. 9 and decision of the
Court of Appeal of Liege, Feb. 26, 1917, Pasicrisie Belge, 1918. II. 182.
55
Court of Cassation, June 4, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1919. I. 97 at 109-110.
56
Quoted in Auditeur Militaire v. G. Van Dieren, Council of War (Court
Martial) of Brabant, Jan. 31, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1919. III. 1.
57
Quoted from the decision in the case cited in the preceding note. The sweeping dictum of the not entirely authoritative Court Martial should be taken "with a grain
of salt."
58
ln order to "avoid confusion" (Court of Cassation in the aforequoted deci~ion
of June 4, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1919. I. 97 at 109) the "absent'' Belgian Govern-
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What would be the effect of this radical Belgian "postliminy"
theory if extended so as to apply during the occupation and within the
occupied territory? Very little was said by the Belgian <:ourts on this
point which is of vital importance for our inquiry. That in such case
the theory would not be carried to the limits, is indicated by a dictum
of the Court of Appeal of Brussels asserting that only those laws of
the "absent" sovereign "which do not pertain to the conflict of the
belligerents" should apply in occupied territory during the occupation;
however, "the new laws"promulgated by the legal power [that is, "absent" sovereign] in order to combat the occupant and hamper his rule
are not applicable in those regions where a belligerent occupation had
been established." 59
The Belgian doctrine has been followed in other jurisdictions, such
as Poland and the former Latvia. 60
d. Political motives behind the doctrines. It has been said with
some justification that the Anglo-American, German and Belgian
doctrines were at least to some degree influenced by the history of
the respective countries in international relations. Belgium has shown
the tendency to restrict to a minimum the powers of the occupant and
to construe broadly the powers of the "absent" sovereign in occupied
territory because she has repeatedly been the victim of enemy occupations. 61 The German doctrine, on the other hand, has favored the
widest possible•interpretation of the powers of the belligerent occupant
while cutting down to the bone the authority of the occupant under an
armistice occupation. This attitude may have been influenced by the
ment published Decree-Law of April 8, 1917 providing that "subject to any express
provision to the contrary, the decree-laws, orders and regulations of the legal authority
are obligatory throughout the Kingdom. The administrative and judicial authorities
will apply them concurrently with the liberation of the country and without further
publication." (Recueil des lois et arretes royaux 1917, p. 204). This law was obviously
enacted in the anticipation of the liberation of Belgium and, as was correctly pointed
out, when read closely, provided merely for a type of "postliminy." [Rapport au Roi
in Recueil des lois arretes royaux 1917, p. 200. FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL
Eco~oMic, LAw OF BELLIGERENT OccuPATION 137 (1942)].
59
Court of Appeal, Bruxelles, April 23, 1919, Pasicrisie Belge, 1919. II. 83 at 84.
Italics supplied.
60
Stansiuk v. Klewec, Polish Supreme Court, 3d Div., May II, 1927, ANN. DIG.
OF PuB. INT. L., 1927-1928, Case No. 380, p. 560. Kulturas Balss Co-operative
Society v. Latvian Ministry for Home Affairs, Latvia, The Senate, 1920, ANN. DIG.
OF PuB. INT. L. 1919-1922, Case No. 321.
61
FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL EcoNoMIC LAW oF BELLIGERENT OccuPATION 15 (1942).

LAW OF BELLIGERENT OccuPATION

fact that the Germans have repeatedly engaged in the catastrophic
game of invading and occupying territories of other nations; in World
War I they were eventually defeated and a part of their own territory
occupied under an armistice. 62 Great Britain and the United States
were said to ha;ve assumed an "in-between position" because in the
past they "had not been afraid of occupation for their own territory
and had themselves engaged in occupations" but on the other hand
had been "friends and allies of past and prospective victims." 68

IV
PRACTICAL CONSIDERATIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE EFFECTS OF
"ABSENT" SovEREIGN's LEGISLATION IN OccuPIED TERRITORY

A. During Hostilities
It will be noted that no instance has been given in the foregoing
analysis, of a belligerent occupant giving consideration to the "abl,ent"
sovereign's legislation while hostilities were in progress. It is doubtful
that any such instance exists.
While the hostilities are in progress the occupant probably would
be unaware of the exact content of the "absent" enemy government
legislation. The present practice of non-hostile relations between the
belligerents does not provide for the transmittal of the official texts
of such legislation from the "absent" sovereign to the occupant.
The prevailing practice would not be likely to cause difficulties
during short wars and short belligerent occupations, where an immediate need for extensive legislative reforms in occupied territory
would not usually arise and where the occupant would be faced with
other more pressing tasks. The lawmaking powers granted to the
occupant by Article 43 of the Hague Regulations for the purpose of
ensuring public order and safety would normally meet the requirements of the occupied territory during this brief period.64
Furthermore, as was brought out by the Allied experience particularly in the Sicilian and South Italian campaigns, the occupant's military government would be kept busy by internal administrative
questions and by problems of a local character and could not divert
62
The Allied occupation of° Germany following the surrender of German armies
in World War II and the total defeat of Germany cannot be termed an armistice occupation and is therefore not considered in this article.

63

FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL EcoNoM1c LAW oF BELLIGERENT Oc-

cuPATION
64

15 (1942).

See note 18, supra.
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part of its manpower to the study of the new enemy legislation, assuming that it would be available.
The problem, however, is bound to become acute in cases of a
protracted belligerent occupation. During such occupation the "absent"
sovereign might undertake useful legislative reforms which are in
no way directed against the occupant's war effort, and which the latter
could not effect on his own initiative without exceeding the limits
imposed upon his lawmaking powers by Article 43 of the Regulations.
These Regulations were drafted in the "laissez faire" era which did
not envisage the modern industrial state with its complex economic,
social and ad¥Unistrative problems and with a more or less broad
government control requiring a continuous flow of legislation, particularly in time of war.
A partial remedy might be found in the readjustment or reinterpretation of the Hague Regulations, which have proved antiquated
in many respects. 65 Another way, which might moderate the tendencies
toward excessive exercise of lawmaking powers by the occupant would
be for him to give effect, whenever military and political conditions
permit, to the legislation of the "absent" enemy sovereign.
This approach was envisaged by an American author writing in
the second :year of American participation in World War IL While
admitting that the Hague Regulations do not impose upon the belligerent occupint a legal obligation to give effect to the "absent" sovereign's new laws, he states: _
"Nevertheless, one would go too far in assuming, as has been
done by various authorities, that an absent sovereign is absolutely
precluded from legislating for occupied areas. The sovereignty
of the absent sovereign over the region remains in existence and,
from a more practical point of view, the occupant may and should
have no objection to timely alterations of existing laws by the old
sovereign 66 in those fields which the occupant has not seen fit to
subject to his own legislative power.... The situation is different,
however, where the occupant and the sovereign would be likely
to issue conflicting instructions. It has usually been argued that
the inhabitants should not be exposed to such a conflict involving
!heir consciences and lives; that the actual power of the occupant
65 For criticism of Hague Regulations see FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL
EcoNoMic LAW OF BELLIGERENT OccuPATION 14, 28-29 (1942); OPPENHEIM,
INTERNATIONAL LAW, 6th ed. by Lauterpacht, 345 (1940).
66
Italics supplied.
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cannot be eliminated; and that therefore the power of the occupant should prevail over that of the absent sovereign. The
occupant certainly has the physical power to prevent laws and
decrees of the absent sovereign from being enforced, and, inde~d,
even from being duly promulgated. Quite apart from the international rights or wrongs of the situation it is not certain whether
a law that cannot be enforced and promulgated can at all be
treated as a positive law." 67
B. Under Armistice Occupation
As shown on the preceding pages, according to the German view
the occupant must, as a matter of law, in the absence of a provision
in the armistice agreement, allow the "absent" sovereign to legislate
in territory occupied after the conclusion of the armistice. The occupant's lawmaking authority in such territory is confined to the
narrow field required for the protection of the occupying troops. The
weight of the British and United States authority, on the other hand,
denies the existence of any such legal duty.
A fundamental principle of the law of occupation demands that
an occupant, in exercising any of his rights in occupied territory should
do so within the limits of the exigencies arising out of the two factors
which lie at the basis of his status in the occupied territory: ( r) his
interest in the success of his military operations, and ( 2) his right and
duty to maintain public safety and order under Article 43 of the
Regulations, for the protection of his own troops and of the population.68 Even under the Anglo-American view that in the present state
of the law there exists no fundamental difference between the preand post-armistice occupation, it is believed that the decrease in the
intensity of these exigencies upon the conclusion of an armistice agreement should cause the occupant to narrow proportionately the scope
of his powers in the occupied territory. "This consideration has not been
ignored in the Anglo-American practice relating to the lawmaking

67 FEILCHENFELD, THE INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIC LAw OF BELLIGERENT OcCUPATION 135-136 (1942). Compare McNair, "Municipal Effects of Belligerent
Occupation," 57 L. Q. REv. 33 at 73 (1941): "Principle seems to demand that,
assuming the new law [ enacted by an "absent'' sovereign] to fall within the category
of that large portion of national law which persists during the occupation and which
the enemy occupant cannot lawfully change or annul, it ought to operate in occupied
territory."
68 SPAIGHT, WAR RIGHTS ON LAND 322 (19n); LAw OF BELLIGERENT OccuPAnoN, J.A.G.S. Text n, p. 64 (1944); U.S. FM 27-10, 1f1f 283, 285; U.S. FM
25-5, § 3.
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procedures in occupied territory after the signing of the artrust1ce.
In fact, it was pointed out by an American author that "there is
usually no attempt completely to prevent the absent government from
legislating for such regions as become ·or remain occupied during an
armistice." 69
The extent to which the occupant gives effect to the "absent"
sovereign's legislation in occupied territory after the armistice varies
with the varying factual picture. During the initial stages of the
armistice occupation' or where this occupation lasts a few months only,
such legislation might not be considered by the occupant. Once, however, the occupant's administrative machinery is consolidated, some
if not all, of such laws would be given effect in occupied territory
either in their original form sanctioned by the occupant or in the form
of the occupant's own proclamations. The selection of such laws would
depend primarily on the military interests of the occupant, on the
legislative requirements of the occupied territory and on the political
relationship between the governments of the occupant and of the
"absent" sovereign.
Nevertheless the "absent" sovereign will not be permitted to
enact legislation with an automatic effect in occupied territory. This
position is in accord with- the Anglo-American view that the ultimate
administrative responsibility in occupied territory continues to rest
with the occupant after the conclusion of the armistice. It might perhaps be argued in support of this position that a simultaneous operation of two legislative sources in the occupied territory might create
a conflict envisaged by the_ already quoted American author or might
be otherwise prejudicial to an effective administration or to the political relationship between the occupant and the "absent" government.
The doubts, if any, as to the powers of the occupant with respect
to the legislation of the "absent" sovereign during an armistice occupation could be dispelled by inserting an appropriate clause in the
armistice agreement. This, however, has not been the practice thus
far despite the modern tendency to enlarge the scope of_ armistice
agreements beyond the traditional provisions for the cessation of hostil- ities. The insertion of such a clause woula. admittedly solve the legal
aspect of the problem. Nevertheless, the occupant would still be faced
with the question whether and to what extent he should permit, as
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a matter of policy, the "absent" government's legislation to become
effective in occupied territory. In this connection a responsible occupant, conscious of his enlightened self-interest and of his moral obligations as a member of the community of nations, will take into
account a number of military, political and social factors, some of
which are suggested in this article.
Recent developments in international law, such as the adoption of
the United Nations Charter and of the Charter of the International
Tribunal at Nuremberg, as well as the sentences rendered by this
tribunal, profoundly affected the function of war in the modern law
of nations. 70 Once :firmly established these developments will of
necessity lead to a revision in the concept of the belligerent occupation.
Nevertheless, the problems which the belligerent occupant faced
in the past and the past practice in general, will have to be taken into
account if and when, for instance, rules are designed for the conduct of
such "action by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United
Nations" as ordered by the Security Council of the United Nations
"to maintain or restore international peace and security" under Article
42 of the United Nations Charter or for the exercise of the right of
self-defense by a member of the United Nations in accordance with
Article 5 r in case of an armed attack. Furthermore, should an aggressor nation in the course of an aggression violate an established rule of
international law of belligerent occupation it would be held answerable for such violation, in addition to its general responsibilities arising
out of its waging an aggressive war.

V
THE ScHIO CASE AND THE ANGLO-AMERICAN DocTRINE

The Anglo-American view on the armistice occupation is clearly
reflected in the already quoted statement of the Allied Chief Civil
Affairs Officer pertaining to the Schio case, and with the practice of
the Allied occupant in Italy in general.
According to this view Allied Military Government was justified
in the assumption that it did not have a legal duty to "implement"
in occupied Italian territory Decree 224 eliminating capital punishment
from the Penal Code, or for that matter any other law enacted by the
"absent" Italian Government. However, soon after the signing of
70
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the armistice agreement with Italy, in consideration of the Italian
declaration of war against Germany and of the cooperation offered ·by
the Italian Government and by the majority of Italian people, the
Allied powers initiated a policy aimed at the reduction of Allied
Military Government functions in Italy within the limits of military
necessity and at an active support of the Italian Government. The
procedure of "implementation" whereby almost all of the new Italian
laws were made applicable in occupied territory was only one manifestation of this policy. 71
Nevertheless, when Decree 224 was enacted by the Italian Government in the summer of I 944 the Allied Military Government refused to "implement" it in Allied occupied territory as potentially
harmful to Allied military interests because, as the Chief Civil Affairs
Officer pointed out in paragraph 6 of his statement, "at that time,"
(I) Allied military operations in Italy were in full progress, and
(2) most of northern Italy was in enemy hands.
There is little doubt that the Allied authorities appreciated the
desire of the Italian Government in Rome to return at the earliest
possible moment to the fundamental pre-fascist concept in Italian
criminal law rejecting the capital penalty as a general form of punishment. Yet the Allied Military Government apparently felt "at that
time" that its task of· preserving public order and safety behind the
lines during a campaign marked by an unparalleled bitterness and
containing elements of civil war, did not permit the elimination in
occupied territory of the death penalty from the Italian Penal Code
where it had existed for t4e last fourteen years. In this conflict between
the Allied military interests and the policy of assisting the Italian
Government in repealing fascist inspired legislation, the first prevailed.
With the end of hostilities in Italy in the spring of 1945, the
Allied occupation assumed the character of a post-armistice occupation
in the usual sense of the word. By that time
(I) the Allied military operations in Italy were reduced to a
non-combatant routine and the military interests of the Allied occupant comprised only the maintenance of public order and safety for
the protection of the Allied troops and installations in Italy, of the
lines of communications for the Allied Armies in Austria, and of the
Italian population itself;
·
n See UNITED STATES AND ITALY, 1936-1946, DocuMENTARY RECORD, Dept.
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(2) the territory of northern Italy was wrested from the enemy
and came under the Allied control.
With the pressure of the military exigencies reduced, the two
reasons given by the Chief Civil Affairs Officer as underlying the
refusal of the Allied Military Government to implement Decree 224
at the time of its enactment, had in substance disappeared.
On the other hand, the Allied policy toward the Italian Government mentioned at the beginning of this section became gradually
more effective. Even before the termination of hostilities it acquired
an added impetus from the important developments in the course of
the second part of I944 and early in r945: notable concessions of a
:financial and political nature were made to the Italian Government
mitigating in fact the rigor of the terms of surrender; the Allied occupation was lifted in the rear areas of the Italian theater of operations
and important sectors of the national administration were restored to
the Italian Government.72
Notwithstanding these considerations of policy, the Allied Military
Government apparently still felt at the time of the Schio trial in the
fall of r945, several months after the end of hostilities in Italy, that
it could not modify its stand on Decree 224. The reason for this
position may perhaps be found in the wave of increased criminality
and tense atmosphere prevailing at that time in the liberated areas of
northern Italy. In _?-ddition to common offences, many crimes, such
as repeated attacks on jails, were being committed for political reasons.
In these circumstances, the Allied Military Government may have
believed that the power to impose the death penalty in "civil crimes"
such as that of Schio, under the unamended text of the Penal Code,
was still indispensable for the maintenance of. public safety and order
for which the Allied occupation authorities were responsible in accordance with Article 43 of the Hague Regulations.
Crime was rampant even in the unoccupied territory of Sicily and
of central and southern Italy all of which had been returned to the
administration of the Italian Government. In order to combat the in72
On the 25th of October 1944, Allied Governments announced the exchange
of diplomatic representatives with the Italian Government; on January 30, 1945 the
Combined Chiefs of Staff issued a directive outlining a new status for Italy; this
directive was communicated to the Italian Government by the Acting President of the
Allied Commission Mr. MacMillan in an "Aide-memoire" of February 24, 1945;
Allied Commission officers were withdrawn from southern Italy on April 1, 1945. See
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creased act1v1ties of the traditional Sicilian organized banditry, the
Italian Ministry of Interior prepared and the Italian Government
approved in May, r945 an emergency measure restoring the death
penalty, as a temporary exception, for certain offences such as armed
robbery and the organization of armed bands. 73 This decree was "implemented" in the occupied territory by the usual order of the Allied
Military Government and beqme effective in the Province of Vicenza,
where the Schio massacre took place, on July r2, r945, six days after
the date of the massacre. Had this decree been in force in the Province
of :Vicenza on the date of the crime, perhaps one or more of the
defendants might have been charged and sentenced to death under its
provisions, assuming that the prosecution would have been able to
gather enough evidence to prove that they ha~ "organized" the armed
band of Schio assassins and assuming further that the Court would
have followed the language of the decree rather than the legislative
intent. However, the Allied prosecutor being limited as he was to the
law prevailing in Vicenza Province at the time of the massacre, drafted
the charges under the unamended text of the Penal Code without any
reference either to the emergency decree or to Decree 224.
The final action was taken on the Schio case in December, r945,
less than two weeks before the termination of the Allied Military
Government in_ Italy.74 At that time the Chief Ciyil Affairs Officer
announced that he had commuted the death sentences to life imprisonment by an act of pardon based on consideration of the above described
Allied public policy 75 and specifically on the desire of the Allied Military Government
.
{a) to preserve the uniformity and continuity of the Italian legal
system,76
73
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1945.
74 After December 31, 1945, Allied Military Government continued only in the
disputed Venezia Giulia area.
75 The Chief Civil Affairs Officer ~id not base the pardon on grounds relating
to the persons of the defendants who placed themselves "beyond the· consideration of
clemency." He also declared that there was no reason at law for the reversal ·of the
judgment.
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See 1f 6 of the statement as quoted in- Part I. "Had the accused been charged
with the same offense in territory restored to the Italian Government, they could not
have been so sentenced even in an A.M.G. court. Similarly, the death sentences could
not have been confirmed by me had the northern [ Allied occupied] Regions been
restored to Italian Government administration by this date."
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(b) to facilitate the return in Italian Jaw to the pre-fascist concepts,77
( c) not "to override Italian basic concepts of justice" even though
they might differ from the corresponding ideas in the Allied legal
systems. 78
The policy, heretofore subordinated to the Allied military interests
in the preservation of public safety was finally permitted to prevail and
Decree 224 was in effect applied, if only indirectly, through the medium of a pardon and for the sole purpose of the Schio sentences.
Had the Chief Civil Affairs Officer intended to pass an act of a
more general character than a mere pardon he might have given instructions, before taking action on the death sentences, for an Allied
Military Government order to be issued which would provide that
Decree 224, previously excluded from application in occupied territory
by an Allied Military Government Order, should henceforth apply
therein. The death sentences would then have been modified by operation of law pursuant to article 2 of the Italian Penal Code which
states as follows:
" ... If the law of the time when the offence was committed
and the subsequent laws are different, that law shall be applied
whose provisions. a:re more favorable to the offender unless an
irrevocable sentence has been pronounced...." 79
As it was, Decree 224 became effective in northern Italy upon the
termination of Allied Military Government on Jan r, r946.

VI
CONCLUSION

The decision in the Schio case presents a conflict facing an occupant
under the armistice occupation, between a "new" law of the "absent"
sovereign affecting a fundamental legal institution of the occupied
See 1f1f 5 and 7 of the Statement of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
See 1f 7 of the Statement of the Chief Civil Affairs Officer.
79
By virtue of Art. I of Decree 224 which would thus have become effective
in occupied territory the death sentences would have been commuted to life imprison- '
ment with hard labor. However, the legislative adjustment requiring a publication of
a formal A.M.G. order in the Italian Official Gazette and delivery thereof to the
Prefect of each Province in occupied territory (see footnote 7, supra) would have
hardly been completed in the I I days period remaining between the date of the final
decision in the Schio case (December 20, 1945) and the termination of the Allied
occupation in _northern Italy (December 31, 1945).
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country and the occupant's own decision based upon his refusal to
apply such law in occupied territory.
While reaffirming the legality of such refusal the occupant nevertheless modified his original decision and in the final disposal of the
case followed in effect the provisions of the "new" law.
The decision will no doubt strengthen those modern tendencies in
the British and American doctrine which require the occupant to give
the widest possible application in occupied territory, within the limits
of his legitimate military interests, to "absent" sovereign's "new" laws.

